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388 
IS YOUR SMARTPHONE CONVERSATION 
PRIVATE? THE STINGRAY DEVICE’S IMPACT ON 
PRIVACY IN STATES 
Katherine M. Sullivan+ 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to provide that, 
“subject only to a few, specifically established and well-delineated, exceptions,” 
the search or seizure of a person or place must be supported by a warrant.1  
However, the Twenty-First Century, with its fast-pace, ever-changing 
technology, has introduced devices that place a strain on the application of this 
constitutional right.  The StingRay device is one such example.  The StingRay 
is a mobile surveillance system that mimics a cell tower so that cell phones and 
other mobile devices in the vicinity connect to it, thereby revealing the unique 
identifier and location of those devices.2 
The StingRay devices are more commonly known as cell-site simulators,3 but 
these devices were not originally invented for these purposes.  Currently, the 
devices are used to locate suspects in the United States for alleged crimes, 
including fraud and drug trafficking.4   The devices were originally designed for 
surveillance abroad by entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).5  
Due to national security concerns and international challenges, the CIA sought 
                                                 
 + I am grateful for the insights and assistance from my mentor, Joe S. Cecil, Senior Research 
Associate, Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.  Your expertise in this area of law was 
invaluable. 
 1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few, specifically established and well-delineated, exceptions.”). 
 2. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last updated Mar. 2018) 
[hereinafter Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?]; see also Ellen Nakashima, Justice 




 3. Street-Level Surveillance: Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators/faq (last visited Apr. 18, 2018) [herein 
after Street-Level Surveillance]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: Stingrays, the Spy Tool the Government Tried, and Failed, 
to Hide, WIRED (May 6, 2016, 6:41 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/hacker-lexicon-stingray 
s-spy-tool-government-tried-failed-hide/ (“Although use of the spy technology goes back at least 
20 years . . . their use of it has grown in the last decade as mobile phones and devices have become 
ubiquitous.  Today, they’re used by the military and CIA in conflict zones—to prevent adversaries 
from using a mobile phone to detonate roadside bombs, for example—as well as domestically by 
federal agencies . . . .”). 
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this technology because it was almost impossible to rely on cooperation from 
local telephone providers in foreign countries.6  Thus, these devices were created 
in the interest of national security and counter-terrorism.7 
Private manufacturers—after discovering how invaluable and indispensable 
these devices were—sought to fill the demand.8  The Harris Corporation, the 
major manufacturer of the StingRay devices, did exactly that.9  After many 
devices were purchased by the federal government, the Harris Corporation 
sought to expand their market share into law enforcement agencies at both the 
state and local level.10  The StingRay market has now expanded into state and 
local agencies; there are currently “72 agencies identified in 24 states and the 
District of Columbia that own StingRays.”11 
Judges and defense attorneys were in the dark about these new devices for 
some time.12  When judges signed off on warrants, they often did so without 
knowing what the devices did and the implications from signing the warrant.13  
Often, judges failed to appreciate the degree of invasiveness of the StingRay 
devices.  Other times, the warrant application would deliberately use the vague 
term of “technology” to encompass devices like the StingRay, leaving the judge 
unaware of all that would be included under the umbrella of that term.14 
Historically, judges have been aware of pen registers being used, which only 
provide specific phone numbers of a cell phone;15  however, StingRay devices 
                                                 
 6. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less 
than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform 
of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 146 n.38 (2013). 
 7. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 3. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Allison Grande, Immigration Officials Pushed to Detail Cellphone Tracking, LAW360 
(May 19, 2017, 8:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/926160/immigration-officials-pushed-
to-detail-cellphone-tracking (noting that the Harris Corporation uses the “StingRay” label as the 
now, well-known branding name of the device). 
 10. Kris Hermes, Law Enforcement Uses StingRays to Spy on Americans and Lies About It, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2016, 2:11 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kris-hermes/law-
enforcement-uses-stin_b_12080634.html. 
 11. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 2. 
 12. Nathan Freed Wessler, ACLU-Obtained Documents Reveal Breadth of Secretive Stingray 
Use in Florida, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 22, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/fr 
ee-future/aclu-obtained-documents-reveal-breadth-secretive-stingray-use-florida. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Andrew Hemmer, Note, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The New Heightened 
Judicial Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI. -KENT L. REV. 295, 306–07 (2016) (“Congress 
enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, and one provision of the Act amended the definition of a ‘pen 
register’ to make it more encompassing.  Due to this amendment to the Pen Register Statute, law 
enforcement agencies have been able to convince some magistrates to issue court orders under the 
statute for the use of Stingrays.”). 
 15. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (“A pen register is a mechanical device 
that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when 
the dial on the telephone is released.  It does not overhear oral communications and does not 
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provide much more than a ten-digit phone number, they provide the content of 
the phone calls and the precise location of the device.16  Furthermore, defense 
attorneys rarely know whether StingRay devices were used in obtaining 
evidence against their clients, which makes it more difficult to defend their 
clients.17  Ultimately, an individual’s Fourth Amendment right is at risk if state 
and local law enforcement lack clear guidance to determine when it is 
appropriate to use a StingRay without a warrant. 
This Comment will investigate the impact of the StingRay device on an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right and how state and local law enforcement 
will know whether they require a warrant to use the device.  Part I explains how 
the U.S. Supreme Court has adapted to the changes in technology regarding 
privacy rights, as well as how some states have dealt with this issue.  Part II 
analyzes how smartphones in public and private areas should not factor into the 
analysis of whether a warrant is valid. 
Part III proposes how state legislatures and judges can help protect the privacy 
rights of the citizens of their states.  Part IV concludes that, with regard to 
smartphones, there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy, which requires 
a valid warrant before any government intrusion.  This Comment advocates that 
the state legislatures that lack legislation specifically addressing the StingRay 
device should adopt one to protect its citizens’ privacy rights.  Moreover, if the 
state chooses not to adopt such a law, the judiciary must ensure that individual 
privacy rights remain protected. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS ADAPTATION TO ADVANCEMENTS IN 
TECHNOLOGY 
A.  The Intention of the Founding Fathers in the Creation of the Fourth 
Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment establishes: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.18 
                                                 
indicate whether calls are actually completed.” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 
159, 161 n.1 (1977))). 
 16. See Street-Level Surveillance, supra note 3. 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment has two clauses, the “reasonableness 
clause” and the “warrant clause.”  The former establishes the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects.  The latter clause sets out the 
requirements of any valid warrant.  There is also a judicial read-in of the Exclusionary Rule.  See 
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American citizens have been entitled to this protection since the Fourth 
Amendment was ratified by the states in 1791.19  The protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures grew from the disdain of the English 
government’s practice of issuing writs of assistance and other general warrants 
in the colonies.20  To remedy this perceived injustice, the Founding Fathers 
carefully sculpted the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that a man’s house is his 
castle and any general authority to search and seize him, his goods, or his papers 
should not invade the sanctity of his home.21 
B.  When Is a Warrant Required? 
Once the Fourth Amendment applies, it is necessary to determine which 
circumstances require a warrant.  A warrant is “a written order issued by a 
judicial officer or other authorized person commanding a law enforcement 
officer to perform some act incident to the administration of justice.”22  It is 
required to search or seize “persons, houses, papers, and effects” of private 
individuals.23  The warrant must be sufficiently specific and turns on whether 
the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the person, place, or 
thing to be searched or seized.24 
Through a well-developed body of law, courts have recognized a distinction 
between a search and a seizure.  Specifically, a seizure is a “meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interest,”25 and a search “occurs 
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable 
is infringed.”26  Without a valid warrant, searches and seizures performed by 
government actors are deemed presumptively invalid.  Consequently, any 
                                                 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in state court and 
federal court). 
 19. The States ratified the Fourth Amendment on December 15, 1791.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV.  Furthermore, the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as inapplicable to nonresident 
aliens briefly in the United States searched by United States agents.  See United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“[I]t suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth 
Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have 
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”). 
 20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886). 
 21. Id. at 630 (“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his 
conviction of some public offence.”). 
 22. Warrant, LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/warrant (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(incorporating the infamous reasonable expectation of privacy test into the Fourth Amendment). 
 25. Unites States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 26. Id. 
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evidence seized without a warrant will be inadmissible at trial unless a court 
finds that the search was reasonable under the circumstances.27 
1.  Valid Search Warrant 
Search warrants may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause.28  To 
establish probable cause the search warrant must: be supported by oath or 
affirmation by an officer;29 issued by a neutral and detached magistrate;30 and 
“contain a particularized description of the place to be searched and persons or 
things to be seized.”31  The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States stated that 
probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within [the police 
officer’s] knowledge . . . of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 
were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution,” to believe 
that a criminal offense has been committed or is about to take place.32  In Illinois 
v. Gates, the Court held that determining whether probable cause exists requires 
a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.33  As such, the warrant must be 
sufficiently particular in describing what is to be searched and what is to be 
seized to permit a proper determination of probable cause. 
2.  A Warrant Is Not Always Required by Law 
Courts have carved out certain exceptions to the warrant requirement,34 one 
of which is the “exigent circumstances” exception.35  Exigent circumstances 
                                                 
 27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). 
 28. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925). 
 29. The Fourth Amendment provides that warrants must be founded on probable cause and 
supported by oath or affirmation.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). 
 30. The magistrate cannot be involved directly with the investigation.  See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (finding a judge to be the leader of the search party, thus 
violating this requirement, when he assisted the officers in finding the effects of the warrant, and 
in some circumstances, deferring to the officers’ discretion). 
 31. United States v. Hazelwood, 412 F. App’x 617, 618 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 32. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. 
 33. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). 
 34. These circumstances include the community caretaking exception, the automobile 
exception, and a search incident to arrest.  See Fern Lynn Kletter, Annotation, Necessity of 
Rendering Medical Assistance as Circumstance Permitting Warrantless Entry or Search of 
Building or Premises, 58 A.L.R. 6th 499 Art. 1 § 2 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court 
recognized a community caretaking exception to the warrant clause); accord United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (recognizing an automobile exception to the warrant clause); 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (recognizing the search incident to arrest exception 
to the warrant clause). 
 35. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (“One well-recognized exception applies 
when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978))). 
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exist when obtaining a warrant would be impractical under the circumstances.  
If an officer can show that an “exigent circumstance” exists, the officer may 
enter a home without violating the individual’s constitutional right to be safe 
from an unreasonable search and seizure.36 
Application of this principle to the StingRay device is complicated by the fact 
that the officer never physically enters the home, yet is able to remotely secure 
information from within the home—such as whether certain individuals are 
located in the home.  Thus, such an invasion by law enforcement generally 
requires a warrant.  However, exigent circumstances may exist if, for example, 
law enforcement sought to secure an individual’s location but securing a warrant 
would permit the suspect to evade capture.37  In other words, obtaining the 
warrant would be impractical under the circumstances. 
C.  Supreme Court Rulings: Technology and the Fourth Amendment 
Proper enquiry into whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to “be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” was violated must first 
establish that law enforcement in fact conducted a search.38  If there is no search, 
then there is no need to apply the Fourth Amendment.  To determine if law 
enforcement conducted a search, courts ask two questions: (1) whether that 
person had an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the expectation is 
one which society recognizes as reasonable.39 
In Kyllo v. United States, an officer suspected that the defendant was growing 
marijuana in his house.40  To determine whether the suspicion was correct, the 
police—located in a public roadway—aimed a thermal-imaging device at the 
defendant’s home.41  Based on the information provided by the device, the police 
obtained a search warrant for the home and subsequently found marijuana.42  
The lower court looked at the defendant’s subjective and objective expectation 
                                                 
 36. The Supreme Court has outlined many exigent circumstances including: officers chasing 
a fleeing suspect in hot pursuit and entering premises in order to prevent the imminent destruction 
of evidence.  King, 563 U.S. at 460. 
 37. United States v. Ellis, No. 13-CR-00818 PJH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136217, at *41 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017) (holding that a warrant was not required when using a Stingray to 
determine a suspect’s location when the risk of flight and possession of firearms by the individual 
constituted an exigent circumstance); see also United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 
2016) (“A person wanted on probable cause (and an arrest warrant) who is taken into custody in a 
public place, where he had no legitimate expectation of privacy, cannot complain about how the 
police learned his location.”). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Although the Fourth Amendment Right extends to unreasonable 
searches or seizures by law enforcement, this Comment focuses exclusively on unreasonable 
searches. 
 39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 40. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
 41. Id. at 29. 
 42. Id. at 30. 
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of privacy.43  It determined that because the defendant made no effort to hide the 
heat being emitted from his house, and because the thermal-imaging device did 
not disclose any personal information about the defendant, the use of the 
thermal-imaging device by police did not require a warrant.44  In other words, 
law enforcement’s use of the device did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the information obtained by the 
thermal-imaging machine—the heat signature given off by equipment to grow 
the marijuana plants—was a search under the Fourth Amendment.45  The Court 
reasoned that, without the use of the device, police would only have access to 
that information by physically intruding into a protected area of the defendant’s 
home; therefore, the use of the device constituted a constitutionally protected 
search.  The Court further reasoned that because the thermal-imaging device was 
not in “general public use,” the search was “presumptively unreasonable without 
a warrant.”46 
1.  Electronic Listening Devices 
In Katz v. United States, the government sought to introduce evidence 
obtained by an electronic listening device attached to the exterior of a public 
telephone booth while the defendant used it.47  The defendant regularly used the 
public telephone booth to make calls regarding illicit activity, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had knowledge of this regular occurrence.48  The 
Supreme Court, in overruling the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that once 
the defendant was in the telephone booth and shut the door, he was guaranteed 
that the words he spoke in those conversations would remain private.49  The 
Court found that the FBI agents ignored the defendant’s right under the Fourth 
Amendment when they obtained the telephone booth conversations without a 
search warrant.50 
As technology advanced, the Supreme Court looked at the government’s 
usage of beepers and electronic tracking devices in criminal investigations.  In 
United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation when, without a warrant, law enforcement agents 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 31. 
 44. Id. at 30–31. 
 45. Id. at 34–35. 
 46. Id. at 40. 
 47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 48. Id. at 354. 
 49. Id. at 352; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that 
eavesdropping accomplished by mans of an electronic device that penetrated the premises occupied 
by petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds 
of governmental intrusion, but its protections goes further, and often have nothing to do with 
privacy at all.”). 
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monitored a beeper that was located in a container of chloroform loaded in a car, 
as it traveled through public streets and highways.51  The Court reasoned that the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his car’s 
movements on public roads, and as a result, the monitoring of the beeper by the 
police did not constitute an unconstitutional search.52  In other words, the Knotts 
Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the monitoring of tracking 
devices in public areas.53 
However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo carved out an exception 
to its holding in Knotts.54  With a court order, law enforcement agents placed a 
beeper in a container of ether, which was transported by public roads and 
ultimately stored in a private home.55  Due to the storage of the container in the 
private area, the Court held that the monitoring of the device within a private 
home violated the Fourth Amendment.56  Therefore, to determine whether the 
monitoring of a person violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
would consider the nature of the place in which the individual was being 
monitored; that is, whether the area is public or private.57 
2.  Physical Placement of a Tracking Device on Personal Property 
In the 2012 case United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the placement of a tracking device on an automobile triggered Fourth 
Amendment protections.58  The defendant in Jones was suspected of trafficking 
drugs.  As a result, law enforcement agents sought to monitor Jones’s activity, 
and after obtaining a warrant, installed a tracking device on the bottom of his 
wife’s car while it was parked in a public parking lot.59 
The warrant only authorized installation of the tracking device in the District 
of Columbia and was set to expire after ten days.60  In contradiction of the 
                                                 
 51. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another.”). 
 52. Id. at 285. 
 53. Id. at 282.  Courts have asked the question of whether the electronic tracking devices 
provide information that the police could otherwise not have obtained by visual surveillance.  If 
answered in the negative, it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Compare id. at 285 
(finding no search when monitoring a beeper placed on a car on public roads), with United States 
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (finding that a search occurred when the police monitored a 
beeper which entered into a home). 
 54. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
 55. Id. at 708. 
 56. Id. at 714. (“[T]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to 
visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest 
in the privacy of the residence.”). 
 57. Id. at 714–15. 
 58. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 402–03.  The warrant was issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia after the agents lawfully surveilled the suspect. 
 60. Id. 
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warrant, the agents placed the tracking device on the car on the eleventh day and 
in Maryland.61  The Court determined that installing the device constituted a 
Fourth Amendment search.62  Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority, held that 
physical occupation of private property by means of the tracking device violated 
the Fourth Amendment.63  He reasoned that because the defendant possessed the 
vehicle at the time the government attached the device to the car, it violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.64 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito recognized the changing aspects of 
technology and focused more on the scope and duration of the government’s use 
of the device.65  Justice Alito believed the proper inquiry to the issue was 
“whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the 
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove,” 
notwithstanding the public character of the car’s movements.66 
3.  Possession of a Defendant’s Cell Phone 
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California67  addressed the 
issue of “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information 
on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”68  The 
defendant in Riley was a gang member who was arrested for possession of 
concealed and loaded firearms following a traffic stop.  Incident to his arrest, 
law enforcement subsequently seized and searched his mobile phone.69 
The specific facts of the case are as follows.  Riley was driving on expired 
registration tags and a suspended driver’s license when he was pulled over by 
the police.  Pursuant to department policy, the police were allowed to impound 
the car and conduct an inventory search.70  During this search, police found 
photographs of the defendant standing in front of a car suspected to have been 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 403. 
 62. Id. at 404. 
 63. Justice Scalia reasoned that because the government “physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information,” it would have been considered a “physical 
intrusion” and search “within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”  Id. at 
404–05. 
 64. Id. at 404.  The ruling in Jones caused a “sea change” inside the U.S. Department of 
Justice.  Speaking after the decision, FBI General Counsel Andrew Weissmann noted that it 
prompted the FBI to turn off about 3,000 GPS tracking devices that were in use.  See Julia Angwin, 
FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2012, 
3:36 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-after-
supreme-court-ruling. 
 65. Jones, 565 U.S. at 419. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 68. Id. at 2480. 
 69. The phone, a smartphone, was seized from the defendant’s pants pocket and was searched 
by the police because “gang members will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of 
themselves with the guns.”  Id. at 2480–81. 
 70. Id. at 2480. 
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involved in a shooting weeks earlier.71  Ultimately, the defendant was charged 
with attempted murder, firing at an occupied vehicle, and assault with a 
semiautomatic weapon in connection with that shooting.  At trial, Riley 
unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence acquired during this search.72 
The Supreme Court found that the evidence from his cell phone used at trial 
was discovered through an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.73  
The Court considered whether the government had a legitimate interest in 
assessing the material on the phone without a warrant.74  The Court found that 
the search was unnecessary for the protection of the officers and held that the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.75  
The Court reasoned that since “[d]igital  data stored on a cell phone cannot itself 
be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer,” the search incident to arrest 
exception did not apply.76  Furthermore, the Court found the governmental 
interests were minimal compared to the degree of intrusion against the 
defendant, and therefore, triggering the warrant requirement to access the 
contents of the phone.77 
Although Riley was in custody and, as such, had reduced privacy interests, 
they did not disappear entirely.78  The Court specifically rejected the 
government’s argument that the “officers could search cell phone data if they 
could have obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.”79  
                                                 
 71. Id. at 2481. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2495. 
 74. Id. at 2484. 
 75. Id. at 2485.  Generally, the search incident to arrest exception allows the officer to search 
an arrestee’s person and the immediate area in order to find weapons that may be used against him 
or would allow the arrestee “to resist arrest or effect his escape.”  Id. at 2486 (quoting Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
 76. Interestingly, the Court left open the possibility for law enforcement to search the 
“physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon—say, to determine 
whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case.”  Id. at 2485 (emphasis added).  
However, as discussed, this search involved data, not razor blades.  The Court also addressed 
another warrant exception: the prevention of destruction of evidence.  To this point, the Court ruled 
that under these circumstances, where the defendant’s phone was already secured, “there is no 
longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.”  
Id. at 2486.  Moreover, the Court discussed the possibility of remote wiping, and noted that the 
officers could do two things to prevent this: (1) “turn the phone off or remove its battery”; or (2) 
“leave [the] phone powered on and place it in an enclosure that isolates the phone from radio 
waves.”  These enclosures are commonly called “Faraday bags.”  Id. at 2487. 
 77. Id. at 2495. 
 78. Id. at 2488. 
 79. Id. at 2493.  To illustrate the Chief Justice’s point, “the fact that a search in the pre-digital 
era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of 
photos in a digital gallery.”  Id.  Similarly, “the fact that someone could have tucked a paper bank 
statement in a pocket does not justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years.”  
Id.  The Court here was clearly worried about the degree of intrusion and quantity of data acquired 
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Because the amount of digital data that can be stored on a phone is far greater 
than what one single person can put in their pockets, the Court concluded: 
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience.  
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many 
Americans “the privacies of life.”  The fact that technology now 
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not 
make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the 
Founders fought.  Our answer to the question of what police must do 
before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly 
simple—get a warrant.80 
D.  The Department of Justice Policy Regarding StingRay Devices 
1.  Federal Government Addressing the Issue 
On September 3, 2015, about a year after the Riley decision, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) instituted a new policy requiring the FBI and other federal 
agencies to obtain a search warrant before using the StingRay device.81  In the 
application for a warrant, the new policy requires DOJ officials to specifically 
disclose to judges that a cell-site simulator will be used and “describe in general 
terms the technique to be employed.”82  The DOJ’s policy allows for exempted 
circumstances that would permit law enforcement agents to use the device 
without first obtaining a search warrant.83  It is important to note that this policy 
applies in all instances involving the DOJ’s use of StingRay devices “in support 
of other Federal agencies and/or State and Local law enforcement agencies.”84 
2.  Where Do States Stand on the Issue? 
Even though the DOJ policy applies when the federal government uses the 
device to assist state and local law enforcement, it fails to extend to scenarios 
                                                 
in these searches when compared to singular, individual documents discoverable in the pre-digital 
world. 
 80. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 81. Press Release, No. 15-1084, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice 
Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015), https://w 
ww.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators 
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Exigent circumstances would be included in the exception to the warrant requirement.  
The exigent circumstances described are those very same exceptions in the non-digital world: 
“These include the need to protect human life or a very serious injury; the prevention of the 
imminent destruction of evidence; the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by 
a suspect or convicted fugitive from justice.”  Id.  Other circumstances excluded from the warrant 
requirement involve situations in which obtaining a search warrant is “impracticable.”  However, 
the Department expects these circumstances “to be very limited” and requires executive level 
approval of a warrantless search.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
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where state and local governments act on their own.  Former Representative 
Jason Chaffetz, a Republican from Utah, introduced the Cell-Site Simulator Act 
of 2015, also known as the Stingray Privacy Act to the House of Representatives 
in November of 2015 to address that concern.85  The new bill would require state 
and local law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant before they could use 
cell-cite simulator devices in pursuit of charges under Title 18 of the United 
States Code.86  However, the bill as introduced by Representative Chaffetz never 
made it out of committee; this left state and local authorities in the same position: 
warrant limbo. 
The following chart illustrates the use of cell-site simulators at the state and 
local law enforcement level.87 
States that currently have local 
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 85. Stingray Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 3871, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 86. Id. § 2(a). 
 87. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 2. 
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Although the extent of the use of cell-site simulators in the states not listed 
above is unknown, the American Civil Liberties Union has identified seventy-
two law enforcement agencies in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia 
that own StingRay devices.88  Notably, however, some of these state legislatures 
have enacted laws to protect their residents against unreasonable use of these.  
The following table is illustrative:89 
California Enacted in 2015 Requires warrant for 
both historical and real-
time location data 
Colorado Enacted in 2014 Requires warrant for 
location data obtained 
from devices but not 
from service providers 
Illinois Enacted in 2014 Protects only real-time 
location data 
Indiana  Enacted in 2014 Protects only real-time 
location data, but also 
requires warrant for 
drone use and for 
electronic device 
searches  
Iowa Enacted in 2014 Applies only to Global 
Positioning System 
(GPS) tracking devices 
Maine  Enacted in 2013 Requires warrant for 
both historical and real-
time location data 
Maryland Enacted in 2014 Applies only real-time 
location data 
Minnesota  Enacted in 2014 Requires warrant for 
both historical and real-
time location data  
Montana  Enacted in 2013 Requires warrant for 
both historical and real-
time location data 
New Hampshire  Enacted in 2015 Requires warrant for 
both historical and real-
time location data 
                                                 
 88. Id. 
 89. Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, AM. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 26, 2015, 1:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-locatio 
n-privacy-legislation-states-2015. 
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Tennessee  Enacted in 2014 Amended to 
undermine all protections 
Utah  Enacted in 2014 Requires warrant for 
both historical and real-
time location data, as 
well as electronic 
communications content 
Virginia  Enacted in 2015 Requires warrant for 
use of StingRay devices 
Washington  Enacted in 2015 Requires warrant for 
use of StingRay devices 
Wisconsin  Enacted in 2014 Permits location 
tracking under a less 
protective legal standard 
 
As demonstrated in the above table, these fifteen states have enacted a law 
addressing warrants and the use of cell-site stimulators.  The protections vary 
from either requiring a warrant for historical information, real-time location, or 
a hybrid of both. 
Even though some states have not passed legislation on the matter, they have 
been subjected to limitations by their own judiciary.  For example, in Tracey v. 
State, the Florida Supreme Court required a warrant for real-time location 
information that would be obtained through use of the StingRay device.90  In 
attempting to develop a workable framework, the Florida Supreme Court 
rejected the application of the mosaic theory to the Fourth Amendment search 
analysis. 
The mosaic theory stands for the proposition that “discrete acts of surveillance 
by law enforcement may be lawful in isolation, but may otherwise infringe on 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the aggregate because they ‘paint an 
intimate picture of a defendant’s life.’”91  However, the court noted that applying 
the theory was “problematic where traditional surveillance becomes a search 
only after some specified period of time.”92  It concluded “that basing the 
                                                 
 90. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“Therefore, we hold that regardless of 
Tracey’s location on public roads, the use of his cell site location information emanating from his 
cell phone in order to track him in real time was a search within the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment for which probable cause was required.”). 
 91. Id. at 520 (quoting United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740, 771 (D. Md. 2013)). 
 92. Id. 
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determination as to whether warrantless real time cell-site location tracking 
violates the Fourth Amendment on the length of time the cell phone is monitored 
is not a workable analysis.”93  Thus, every decision would need to be made on a 
case-by-case basis.94 
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society was now prepared to recognize as 
reasonable, thereby requiring a warrant.  This rang true even when the defendant 
was on a public road and did not voluntarily convey his whereabouts to the 
service provider “for any purpose other than to enable use of his cell phone for 
its intended purpose.”95 
In State v. Earls, the Supreme Court of New Jersey confronted the issue of 
whether the warrant requirement applied when police obtain a defendant’s cell 
phone location information from a cell phone service provider.96  Phrased 
another way,  the New Jersey Supreme Court “consider[ed] whether people have 
a constitutional right of privacy in cell-phone location information.”97  The facts 
of Earls stemmed from the investigation of a series of residential burglaries in 
the Middletown Township.  The police obtained a court order to trace a cell 
phone stolen in one of the burglaries.  The trace led police to a man in possession 
of the stolen phone who reported purchasing the phone from his cousin—
defendant Thomas Earls.98 
After obtaining assistance from Earls’ former girlfriend, police located the 
stolen material in a storage unit belonging to the former girlfriend.  The next 
day, the girlfriend’s relative contacted police to report that Earls learned of her 
cooperation with police and threatened to harm her in retaliation.  Immediately, 
police obtained an arrest warrant for Earls and initiated an aggressive attempt to 
locate Earls and his potential hostage.99  To locate them, police contacted his 
mobile service provider without seeking a court order or warrant to obtain his 
cell phone location information.100  After three separate cell phone location 
tracings and with the assistance of a neighboring police department, police 
located and arrested Earls.101 
                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“It requires case-by-case, after-the-fact, ad hoc determinations whether the length of 
the monitoring crossed the threshold of the Fourth Amendment in each case challenged.”). 
 95. Id. at 525. 
 96. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Earls’ cousin further alleged that Earls “had been involved in residential burglaries and 
kept the proceeds in a storage unit that either defendant or his former girlfriend, Desiree Gates, had 
rented.”  Id. at 633.  After police contacted Gates, she agreed to assist police in the investigation 
and led police to the location of the storage unit where they found the stolen material.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 633–34. 
 101. Id. at 634. 
2018] Is Your Smartphone Conversation Private? 403 
Based on state constitutional grounds, the New Jersey Supreme Court found 
that an individual’s privacy interests extended to the location of his or her cell 
phone.102  The court held that the police must “obtain a warrant based on a 
showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant 
requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone.”103  
Today, New Jersey lacks legislation mandating that law enforcement obtain a 
warrant to access cell phone location information, but the basis for this 
protection rests on their state constitutional jurisprudence.104 
For the states that lack either legislative or judicial safeguards against 
government use of cell phone location data, the question remains: How will 
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights remain protected? 
II. CONSIDER THE SMARTPHONE AN EXTENSION OF YOUR HOME 
Before the first smartphone came out, an individual carried the basic cell 
phone that was used solely to connect through voice and text communication.  
Now it is impossible to walk down the street without someone bumping into you 
as they scroll the Internet in the palm of their hand.  Smartphones expand to each 
corner of an individual’s life: one can now pay for things; store airplane boarding 
passes; lock one’s home; and navigate their way across any distance in real time 
with extreme precision.  Indeed, many consider the smartphone an extension of 
an individual’s home—just like wallets, car keys, and wedding rings, one never 
leaves home without it.  The inherent danger in that, however, is that such 
technological advances are equally as accessible to state and local law 
enforcement. 
A.  How Smartphones Function Versus Old Technology 
There is a big difference between a cell phone and a smartphone, the former 
is only used to communicate by text and call, while the latter, in addition to these 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 632. 
 103. Id. at 644.  Interestingly, even though the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a warrant 
was required, it remanded the case to the Appellate Division “to determine whether the emergency 
aid doctrine applies to the facts of this case under the newly restated test.”  Id. at 646. 
 104. Id. at 632. 
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functions can access the internet, which includes location or GPS services.105  
Currently, there are more gadgets than people in the world.106 
1.  StingRays Versus Pen Registers 
In its 2015 policy, the DOJ required that cell-site simulators must be 
configured in a “manner that is consistent with” the Pen Register Statute.107  Pen 
Registers are similar to StingRays in that some information from a cell phone 
can be obtained.  The major difference lies, however, in the vast quantity and 
more intrusive degree of information that can be obtained using the StingRay. 
Pen Registers are defined under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986, as “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility 
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any 
communication.”108  Simply stated, Pen Registers only document the phone 
numbers called and received on a particular phone.  On the other hand, the more 
intrusive StingRay device is much more advanced.109  The devices have been 
described as “portable spy device[s] able to track cell phone signals inside 
vehicles, homes and insulated buildings.”110 
One major difference the smartphone introduces into this analysis is the 
amount of time and resources expended by law enforcement when attempting to 
locate a suspect.  In cases like Knotts, the government needed to physically place 
a beeper on the individual’s person while it was limited in range. 111  With the 
                                                 
 105. See Jason Gordon, How Does GPS Work on Cell Phones?, USA TODAY, http://travel 
tips.usatoday.com/gps-work-cell-phones-21574.html (last updated Sept. 12, 2017) (“Cell phones 
with GPS receivers communicate with units from among the 30 global positioning satellites in the 
GPS system.  The built-in receiver trilaterates your position using data from at least three GPS 
satellites and the receiver.  GPS can determine your location by performing a calculation based on 
the intersection point of overlapping spheres determined by the satellites and your phone’s GPS 
receiver.  In simple terms, trilateration uses the distance between the satellites and the receiver to 
create overlapping ‘spheres’ that intersect in a circle.  The intersection is your location on the 
ground.”). 
 106. Zachary Davies Boren, There Are Officially More Mobile Devices than People in the 
World, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 7, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-
and-tech/news/there-are-officially-more-mobile-devices-than-people-in-the-world-9780518.html. 
 107. DOJ Press Release, supra note 81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3125 (2012)). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).  Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland relied on a 
different definition than is found in the statute, as this case predated the enactment of this statute.  
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (defining a pen register as “a mechanical 
device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused 
when the dial on the telephone is released”). 
 109. See generally Clarence Walker, New Hi-Tech Police Surveillance: The “Stingray” Cell 
Phone Spying Device, GLOBAL RES. (May 19, 2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/new-hi-tech-
police-surveillance-the-stingray-cell-phone-spying-device/5331165. 
 110. Id. 
 111. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
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smartphone, the government can track the device’s location remotely and in real 
time, as long as it is turned on and registering with a cell tower.112 
The type of information StingRays collect is called metadata.  Metadata is the 
“data about the communication that allows the communication to successfully 
reach its intended recipient.”113  It includes: the location that the message 
originated from; the device that sent or made the communication; the times at 
which the message was made and sent; and the length or duration of the 
message.114  Without having  proper protections on metadata, individuals can be 
tracked and followed continuously and without warning.  Metadata reveals a lot 
about the individual and, when in the wrong hands, can identify and outline 
many personal details about the individual. 
There is also a difference between private and governmental uses of metadata.  
Companies want metadata because they can capitalize on a target audience for 
marketing purposes—as they could learn the likes and dislikes of the individual 
consumer.  But when the government collects metadata, it could build a profile 
of any individual for a myriad of reasons.  Individuals often willingly allow 
companies like Facebook to collect metadata, which is how many tech 
companies survive.  However, when it comes to the government’s use of 
metadata, individuals are being tracked unwittingly. 
2.  Public Versus Private Areas 
Another issue to consider is whether the cell phone’s location matters.  For 
example, as a person travels home, would she reasonably expect that the 
government could track her because she was using her mobile phone to get 
there?  Law abiding citizen or not, one should not feel threatened by the 
government’s unreasonable conduct. 
Applying the Supreme Court precedent in Kyllo to the StingRay device, it is 
clear that the use of the device without a warrant to monitor the movements of 
an individual inside her own home would constitute an unconstitutional search 
because “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the 
house.’”115  Using the precedent established in Katz, just as the Fourth 
Amendment protected the privacy of the defendant’s conversation in a public 
telephone booth, it should also protect an individual’s cell phone conversation 
                                                 
 112. See Gordon, supra note 105 (“Even the cell phones that don’t have GPS can use cell tower 
position and distance to calculate your location.  Cell phones function by communicating with 
towers connected to a base station in a configuration called a ‘cell.’  As you move through the cell, 
the base station monitors your cell phone’s signal and transfers it to the nearest tower.”). 
 113. Metadata, PRIVACY INT’L, https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/53 (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2016). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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in her car or other visible public locations from being “broadcast[ed] to the 
world.”116 
Unlike the situation in Knotts, but like the circumstances in Karo, an 
individual almost certainly would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his phone’s movement on public roads.  The mobile phone is an extension of the 
“firm line” of the home and may be properly characterized as part of the private 
residence, the Supreme Court should come to a conclusion that a warrantless 
monitoring of a cell phone, which “reveal[ed] no information that could not have 
been obtained through visual surveillance,” was an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.117 
Using Justice Scalia’s rationale in Jones, the government would “physically 
occup[y] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” as soon as 
it begins using the StingRay device and, therefore, would violate the Fourth 
Amendment.118  The Supreme Court, through these decisions, requires that law 
enforcement agencies act reasonably and with care when it comes to an 
individual’s privacy rights.119  The best way to handle this issue is to follow the 
example of the DOJ guidelines and those states with legislation requiring law 
enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before using cell-site simulators. 
B.  The Individual’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Importantly, in today’s technological age, information “disclos[ed] to a third-
party [service] provider, as an essential step to obtaining service altogether, does 
not upend the privacy interest at stake.”120  It is almost impossible in our society 
to not have a smartphone—individuals receive news updates, banking 
information, texts, phone calls, and read books, all from one device, on the go, 
instantaneously.  Individuals do not waive their right to privacy by purchasing 
the device that allows a carrier to obtain one’s location automatically.  A bank 
does not broadcast to the world an account holder’s routing number just because 
it has the information readily available.  That information is sacred, and cell 
phone data is no different. 
Society shapes the behaviors individuals think and believe to be acceptable 
based on social norms.  Society, as it stands today, would not reasonably expect 
                                                 
 116. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“No less than an individual in a business 
office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 117. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“The monitoring of a beeper in a private 
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those 
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”). 
 118. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 404 (2012). 
 119. Even in some cases where the police act reasonably but without a warrant, nevertheless a 
court will find the Fourth Amendment to be violated.  See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 633 (N.J. 
2013) (finding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right was violated even though he police 
thought he took a hostage). 
 120. State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008) (holding limited to New Jersey law). 
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that any information turned over to a service carrier dissolves her privacy 
expectations.121   In addition, it would be unreasonable to think that this 
information should be used against her in a criminal trial without constitutional 
authority to actually obtain that information.122 
III. STATE LEGISLATURE’S ROLE 
As explained above, many states have adopted laws requiring local and state 
law enforcement obtain a warrant before gathering data from smartphones.  
Many states encompass the requirement of obtaining warrants for historical 
locations, real-time location, phone records, content of electronic 
communications, cell phone and internet service provider records, GPS tracking, 
and StingRay tracking.  But no state has passed legislation that encompasses all 
these components. 
It is well known that the law has and will always struggle to match pace with 
technology.123  But the problem herein arises when legislation fails to encompass 
all the protections it should, which forces law enforcement agencies to determine 
when a warrant is necessary.  Of course, there will be cases where obtaining a 
warrant is impracticable, and in those instances, the warrantless search would 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Nonetheless, effective legislation would 
address situations where law enforcement had time to get a warrant but failed to 
do so, impermissibly yielding the protected information from a StingRay search. 
A.  The Ideal State Law for Privacy Rights 
The legislation this Comment proposes has yet to be enacted by any state, but 
seeks to assist states that are looking to address these concerns.  The law this 
Comment recommends is one that requires a warrant for all information that can 
be obtained off a smartphone from a StingRay: historical location, real-time 
location, phone records, content of electronic communications, cell phone and 
internet service provider records.  However, the law must recognize legitimate, 
practical concerns for law enforcement and should only apply if the government 
has a reasonable amount of time to obtain a warrant and no one’s life is endanger.  
This Comment is not advocating that local and state law enforcement agencies 
should never be able to obtain this information, but to obtain the information, 
the agencies must do so with a valid warrant. 
By adopting this proposed law, legislatures would be holding local and state 
law enforcement agencies accountable, while simultaneously protecting the 
individual rights of its citizens.  In passing this law, the legislatures would save 
time and money for themselves, state and local police departments, and state 
                                                 
 121. See id. 
 122. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963). 
 123. See United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1150 n.16 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining 
Moore’s law as “the computing power of today’s cell phone, tablet PC, laptop, etc., is likely to be, 
at least, twice as powerful in two years”). 
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courts.  Perhaps the most important factor to consider is that through effective 
legislation, instances where police failure to secure a warrant leads to the release 
of potentially dangerous individuals would be diminished. 
It is in the best interest of the public to keep dangerous criminals from walking 
the streets.  If they break the law, and if they participate in illegal activities, they 
should be arrested and prosecuted by the government.  But the government must 
do so in a manner consistent with the protection of the Constitution, by obtaining 
a warrant. 
B.  Role of the Judiciary 
The judiciary is at the front lines of protecting individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.124  It is the first to see the warrant, and by the stroke of a 
pen, judges enable or disable law enforcement to act on the warrant and conduct 
a search.  Judges should ask pressing questions of law enforcement personnel 
who apply for warrants; they should ask about who the person of interest is, why 
the department believes there is probable cause, and whether there are other 
available means to figure out where the person of interest is without using the 
StingRay device.125  These questions would help inform the judge to make the 
proper decision. 
Giving judges the opportunity to receive proper training and education about 
what the StingRay devices are, what they really do, and how intrusive they can 
be to an individual are vital to the privacy interests at stake.  With this training, 
judges will be able to fully realize the implications of each StingRay warrant.  
And with each new development in technology, judges will continue to be faced 
with the StingRay and other similar devices as time goes on.  For judges to be 
fully knowledgeable in this area of the law will allow every state to better 
efficiently and effectively pursue justice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Overall, state legislatures that do not have a law addressing the StingRay 
device should adopt one, as it would strike a more equitable balance between 
individual privacy rights and the government’s interests in enforcing its laws.  
Technology is a great tool, especially with regard to law enforcement’s interest 
                                                 
 124. Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, 
Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 899 (2014) (“Because 
courts are best positioned to extract details about hidden investigative techniques when defendants 
are kept entirely in the dark, judges sitting in surveillance cases should press the government for 
those details sua sponte . . . .”). 
 125. See Michele Adelman & Erik Schulwolf, IPhone Access Gets Attention, “Stingrays” Fly 
Under the Radar, LAW360 (Apr. 5, 2016, 10:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/779899/ 
iphone-access-gets-attention-stingrays-fly-under-the-radar (“While it is not clear to what extent 
there is—or will be—large-scale civilian use of Stingrays, the threat of such use underscores the 
need for the general public to be aware of the potential danger posed by Stingray-like devices, and 
for cellphone makers, cellular network providers, and governments to work to mitigate it.”). 
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in public safety, and should not be viewed negatively.  However, there needs to 
be a balance between using advanced technology to excel society and upholding 
the Framers’ intention behind the Fourth Amendment. 
 
